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The Impact of Quantitative Easing on UK Bank Lending: 
Why Banks Do Not Lend to Businesses? 
Mahmoud Fatouh1  Sheri Markose2 and Simone Giansante3 
 
 
Abstract 
The growing proportion of UK bank lending to the financial sector reached a peak in 2007 just before the 
onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).  This marks a trend in the dwindling amount of bank lending to 
private sector non-financial corporations (PNFCs), which was exacerbated with the Great Recession. 
Many central banks aimed to revive bank lending with quantitative easing (QE) and unconventional 
monetary policy.   We propose an agent based computational economics (ACE) model which combines 
the main factors in the economic environment of QE and Basel regulatory framework to analyse why UK 
banks do not prioritize lending to non-financial businesses. The lower bond yields caused by QE 
encourage big firms to substitute away from bank borrowing to bond issuance. In addition, the risk 
weight regime of Basel II/III on capital induces banks to favour mortgages over business loans to small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs). The combination of lower bond yields and Basel II/III capital 
requirements on banks, which, respectively, impact demand and supply of credit in the UK, plays a role 
in the drop of bank loans to businesses.  The ACE model aims to reinstate policy regimes that form 
constraints and incentives for the behaviour of market participants to provide the causal factors in 
observed macro-economic phenomena.  
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1. Introduction 
The great financial crisis (GFC) of 2007 produced severe recessions in major economies and raised the 
threat of a total collapse of the global financial system. The crisis had major repercussions for the UK 
economy that witnessed an increase in unemployment and severe contraction in GDP by about 4.7% in the 
last 3 quarters of 2008. Like the monetary authorities of other countries, the Bank of England (BoE) 
reduced its short-term policy rate to exceptionally low levels from 5.75% to 0.5%, over the period from July 
2007 to March 2009. However, lowering interest rates proved not to be sufficient to support aggregate 
demand and help in the economic recovery to pre-crisis levels. Consequently, following the precedent first 
set by the Bank of Japan in 2001, and more recently by the US Federal Reserve (Fed) Large Scale Asset 
Purchase (LSAPs) programs of November 2008, the BoE Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) launched an 
open-ended asset purchase program (APP) in March 2009.  Unlike conventional open market operations 
involving short term assets, central banks make outright purchases of longer term securities (see, Haldane 
et. al., 2016) under these asset purchase programs, also referred to as quantitative easing (QE). 
As the APP was to be subsumed under the 1997 Monetary Policy Framework, priority was given to 
the necessity of “increasing nominal spending growth to a rate consistent with meeting the inflation 
target in the medium term”4. In addition, the MPC minutes of March 5 2009 note that APP “would also 
mean that the banking system would be holding a higher level of reserves in aggregate, which might 
cause it to increase its lending to companies and households”. At the same time, it was also anticipated 
by the MPC that APP will enhance “functioning of corporate credit markets, that should make it easier 
for some types of companies to raise finance, reducing their reliance on the banking sector” (Ibid.) The 
mechanics of QE aimed at asset purchases from non-bank financial institutions involves new electronic 
central bank money credited to the reserve account of the seller’s bank which, in turn, creates a deposit of 
the same amount favouring the seller. This, so called bank lending channel, which is now replete with bank 
reserves, is expected to increase bank lending to households and businesses5. To what extent were these 
anticipated outcomes of QE borne out? 
                                                             
4This is reported in the letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer of 3 March 2009 and also in the MPC minutes of March 5  
2009(http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20091204142322/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/chxletter_boe050309.pdf,andhttp://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/Documents/mpc/pdf/200
9/mpc0903.pdf). The assets purchases are also seen to be critical to the strategy “to ease the flow of corporate credit… 
increase liquidity and trading activity in some UK financial markets and stimulate issuance by corporate borrowers and the 
resumption of capital market flows” (Ibid). 
5Regarding the targeting of non-bank financial institutions, especially Insurance Companies and Pension Funds, see point 42 in 
the minutes of the MPC meeting for the 4 and 5 March 2009 available 
at:http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/Documents/mpc/pdf/2009/mpc0903.pdf 
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Figure 1: UK Bank Lending to Different Sectors 2006 to 2014       
(a)Amounts Bank Lending (£Billion, RHS Totals) (b) Proportions of Total Lending (%)   
Source: UK ONS Flow of Funds Project: Financial Accounts Excel Sheet 3.2 
Notes: UK Bank lending refers to lending by Monetary and Financial Institution (Totals on right hand side, RHS, Axis of Figure 1.a); 
RoW: Rest of World; HHs: Households; PNFCs: Private non-Financial Corporates; OFIs: Other Financial Institutions; INSs: Insurance 
Companies and Pension Funds. 
As shown in Figure 1 (a)Amounts Bank Lending (£Billion, RHS Totals) (b) Proportions of Total Lending 
(%)  UK total bank lending saw an average growth of 5.5% per quarter between 2007 Q1 and 2008 
Q1, with the latter standing at £3.61 Trillion, suffered falls in the 4%-6% range in the period between 
2008 Q2-2009 Q2.  Within a year from the start of the APP, total bank lending jumped 7% in 2010 Q1 
and the lending to households and private non-financial corporates (PNFCs) peaked at £1.74 Trillion. 
However, over the next 3 years, total bank lending fell by 1%-3% annually. It showed a fall or little to no 
growth in every quarter except for 2013 Q1, probably because of funding for lending scheme (FLS) 
(Churm et. al (2013), Badeley-Chappell (2013)).  It should be noted that when bank lending to rest of the 
world (ROW) is accounted for, domestic lending fell by over £200 bn. Further, lending has been found to 
be skewed in the direction of mortgage lending to households with its share of total bank lending rising 
from 25.69% in 2009Q1 to 38.18% by the end of 2014.  In contrast, non-financial corporations and SMEs 
faced a fall in bank loans with their share of total bank loans falling from 15.91% to 12.16% over the 
same period.  One of the key drivers for this fall in total bank loans is the extent to which non-financial 
firms substituted away from bank loans to bond issuance through the portfolio rebalancing channel.  As 
shown in Figure 2, from the peak of about £600bn of bank loans in September 2008, PNFCs (both big 
firms and SMEs) experienced a reduction of about £185 bn of banks loans with some £68.48n of bond 
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issues by big firms potentially replacing bank loans from March 2009 when APP commenced to April 
2014.   
 
Figure 2: UK PNFC Bond Stock (RHS, Blue) and PNFC Bank Borrowing (LHS, Brown)  
2006 to 2014 (£Billion)  
 
Source: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/iadb/newintermed.asp 
Notes: The variable CPMB29M is used for PNFC bonds with the stock of PNFC bonds valued at £271.297 bn from ONS is used 
for Dec 2005. The variable LPMB4VR for PNFC bank loans is used from above BoE interactive website.   
A number of studies have investigated how QE policy influences the yield curve but lack details on how  
bank lending to the real economy contracted, especially, the lending to SMEs (see, Goodhart and 
Ashworth (2012)) . Gagnon et al. (2010) emphasize the impact of the Fed LSAPs programs on the yields of 
the longer-term assets purchased under the programs. They point out that the programs appear to be 
successful in decreasing the term premiums by 30 to 100 basis points. More comprehensively,  Joyce et. al. 
(2011) specify five transmission channels of the impact of QE. This includes policy signalling, portfolio 
rebalancing, liquidity, broad money, and confidence. They claim that while the effects of QE can spread 
directly into the wider economy through the confidence factor leading to larger aggregate expenditure, 
asset prices and returns represent the path of transmission for the other four channels. By lowering bond 
yields, QE can boost aggregate spending through decreasing the cost of borrowing for firms and 
consumers, Joyce et. al. (2011). Joyce et. al. (2014) have also investigated the specific mechanics of 
portfolio rebalancing by the non-bank financial institutional investors such as Life Insurance and Pension 
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Funds, which substituted the assets purchased by the BoE with bonds issued by PNFCs.  Equities price 
growth caused by a combination of portfolio rebalancing and falling interest rates also boosts the value of 
legacy assets held by financial institutions, a phenomenon that is referred to as “stealth recapitalization” 
(see, Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) and Chodorow-Reich (2014)) that can help banks to remain 
buoyant. Hence, notwithstanding the controversy surrounding the accumulation of ‘excess’ reserves at 
the central bank from APP (see, Reis, 2016)6, and concerns about such extremely loose monetary policy 
conditions for a prolonged period (see, Rajan (2010), Bean et.al. (2015)) in the post GFC period, this 
paper investigates a specific misdirection of bank lending in the context of QE that has resulted in a fall 
in bank loans to the real economy.   
While Office for National Statistics (ONS) data in Figure 1(a) and 1(b) show that domestic lending by UK 
banks fell by more than £218.6 billion in four years after APP was introduced early in 2009, the worrying 
trend is the shrinkage in the amount of loans to UK non-financial businesses falling to as low as 12% of 
total lending when compared to a 50% share of bank loans to financial companies and rest of the world.  
The latter two was as high as 59% in 2008Q1. Indeed, this is part of a bigger problem of “why banks do not 
lend to the real economy”.  This has being discussed by several authors under the rubric of excessive 
growth of the financial sector in advanced economies and, in particular, growing bank activities relating to 
trading assets and financialization7 as these have a bearing on low GDP growth and its extreme volatility 
(Blundell-Wignall-Smith and Roulet (2013), Bezemer and Hudson (2016), Cecchetti et al (2011), Arcand et. 
al. (2011), Stockhammer (2004),   Easterly et. al (2000)). The latter study by Stiglitz and his co-authors was 
one of the first to signal the negative impact of the excessive growth of the financial sector. Though highly 
relevant, the focus of our analysis is not on this wider problem, which also relates to banks’ chase for yield 
and carry trades associated with cross-border bank lending triggered by prolonged low interest rates.  
Instead, this paper aims to reinstate at a micro-level the role of financial regulation, which Stiglitz (2011) 
raised as an urgent issue for incorporation into macro-economic models to test out systemic and 
systematic impacts from the incentives and constraints inherent to regulation.8 
                                                             
6 Between March 2009 and August 2012, the total amount of bank reserves on the liabilities side of the BoE increased from about £31.5 billion to 
£251.9 billion. This increase in bank reserves at the BoE accounts for about 59% the size of APP by the end of 2012. The same phenomena of 
increasing bank reserves at the central bank appears in the US where the reserve balances with Federal Reserve expanded massi vely after the 
launch of large scale asset purchase (LSAP) programs in 2008. The Fed data shows that bank reserves expanded by about 812% between 
October 2008 and August 2012. (Source: Data Download Program (DPD):http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/). 
7 Partnoy and Eisinger (2013) analyse the financial statements of big banks and find that the majority of their income and also outsized losses come 
from traded assets.  
8 Stiglitz (2011), in the context of fixing macroeconomics in the post GFC era, has noted that certain ‘perverse’ incentive structures especially in 
the financial sector were instrumental for the destabilizing events of the GFC.  Stiglitz ( ibid) concludes that .. “the standard macroeconomic 
models neither incorporated them nor provided an explanation for why such incentive structures would become prevalent—and these failures 
are failures of economic science.” 
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Noting the large literature on the fall in bank lending during recessions, including the theories on 
liquidity trap where close to zero interest rates cannot stimulate investment (for example Krugman et al. 
(1998) and Krugman (2000)), a relatively new strand of literature on the impact on bank lending from 
capital adequacy requirements has evolved since the 1990s. The diverse justifications for the decreases in 
bank lending during recessions in the presence of capital adequacy requirements have been based either 
on the lower supply of credit by banks or the lack of demand for loans. The supply-side explanations can 
be grouped into two main categories. Studies in the first category (such as Thakor (1996), and Borio and 
Zhu (2012), Angelini et. al (2015)) attribute the decrease in bank lending to the changes in the risk 
perception of the banks.9 The other category of explanations (for example, Watanabe (2007), Repullo and 
Suarez (2013), and Repullo (2013)) refers to the shortage of bank capital (the capital crunch hypothesis) 
as the main driver of credit rationing in the downturn especially in the presence of pro-cyclical capital 
regulations (see Brunnermeier et al. (2009)).10 Further, the seminal work of Jones (2010) implicates 
banks’ regulatory capital arbitrage for prompting an individually rational but destabilizing and socially 
deleterious response to Basel capital requirements for which Jones claims econometric models may not 
be best suited to analyse.  The perverse incentives of Basel II has been implicated for the large increase 
in leverage in banks with the use of credit default swaps (CDS) in addition to mortgage backed securities 
on bank balance sheets (Blundell-Wignall-Smith and Roullet (2013) and Markose et. al. (2012)) and of 
sovereign debt to reduce capital from the implied risk weighting, respectively, in the carry trades 
associated with the GFC and in the Eurozone crisis (Acharya and Steffan (2014)). Following the Jones 
(2020) precedent, we argue that an agent based model of bank lending is needed to show how the 
constraints and incentives of the risk weighted capital requirements of Basel II and III have a direct 
bearing on the direction of the bank lending, favouring mortgages and penalizing, in particular, SMEs.   
In summary, our agent based model brings together the supply and demand sides of bank lending in 
granular detail. On the demand side, the influence of APP on gilts and corporate bond yields represents 
the exogenously given starting point of our ACE model. Asset purchases by BoE reduce the supply of gilts 
remaining for the private sector (local supply effects) leading to lower yields on gilts and corporate bonds 
(McLaren et al (2014)). The lower bond yields induce BFs to substitute parts of their bank borrowing with 
security debt (bonds). On the supply side, influenced by the capital requirements, that assign different risk 
                                                             
9 However, as noted by Goodhart and Ashworth (2012), relevant factors such as default rates that affect the risk premia of different loan types, 
especially in market downturns do not feature in DSGE models.  In the latter only the risk free policy rate matters.  
10The reliance of capital regulations on the mark-to-market valuations of assets and the market-based measures of risk makes these regulations 
pro-cyclical and increases the volatility in asset markets. That is, the increases in market value of equity during booms accompanied with fixed 
costs of bank regulations induce banks to expand their lending. In contrast, during busts equity prices become low, decreasing the ability of 
banks to provide loans. For a further discussion of the pro-cyclicality of bank regulations see Brunnermeier et al. (2009). 
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weights for different types of loans, banks respond to the drop in big firms borrowing, by expanding 
mortgages and decreasing the amount of loans granted to SMEs, which carry a higher risk weight. The 
mortgage market of UK households is also modelled in detail. The distinction between big firms (BFs) and 
SMEs is important in the context of this paper because the accessibility to debt financing is different for 
the two types of firms. BFs have access to debt security (bond) market, whereas borrowing from banks 
represents the sole source of debt financing for SMEs. In the standard perspective of the fall in the 
demand for loans, for instance, Bikker and Hu (2012) argue that the lack of demand for bank loans rather 
than supply is the key factor in the fall in bank borrowing during slumps.11 However, in this context, little 
consideration has been given to the impact of lower bond yields (and hence the wider use of debt security) 
which is caused by QE, on the demand for bank loans by big non-financial firms. This represents a vital 
element in our explanation of the fall of bank lending to non-financial businesses.  We argue that a 
detailed model rich in regulatory bank capital constraints is needed to show how the slack caused in the 
bank loan portfolio rebalancing by big firm in favour of bonds post APP impact on yield curves helped 
expand UK loans for mortgages at the expense of loans to SMEs.    
Methodologically, we propose a data driven formulation of the ACE model of the developments in 
the UK bank lending markets since APP was introduced along with the regulatory capital constraints on 
banks. We follow the data driven approach described in Markose (2013) in requiring that the 
distributional characteristics of the different economic sectors, such as households, non-financial 
businesses and banks, are based on empirical data. We implement an important empirical scale factor to 
specify the numbers of agents in each class in order that they represent the UK economy.  This also 
permits the outputs of the ACE model to be scaled back up to give simulated results that can be validated 
against actual UK data.  We use Windrum, Fagiolo and Moneta (2007) method for ACE model validation. 
The relevant balance sheet items of each of the 10 biggest UK banks is part of the initial conditions for 
the simulation of UK bank lending decisions for mortgages and to SMEs.  The use of micro-level data sets 
is similar to the BoE agent based model of the UK mortgage market, Baptista et. al (2016), in that granular 
institutional  details and data are included to investigate implications of specific macro-policy relevant 
measures that can alter behaviours of market participants  by using the simulation model for scenario 
analysis and comparative statics. However, while the BoE ACE focusses on the buy to let rental market, 
we consider a wider loan portfolio decision model of UK banks. The important difference in banks’ 
behaviour with the introduction of Basel capital constraints in their portfolio allocation decision, comes 
about only when in addition to the direct costs of the credit risk of default on loans, the different 
                                                             
11 See also, Berger and Udell (1994). 
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categories of bank loans invite an institutionalized cost of capital implied by the Basel risk weighted rule. 
We use data on bank write offs for each of the three categories of loans to proxy for the probability of 
default on the respective loans. The simple 8% capital ratio of Basel I, results in exactly the same optimal 
lending policy for banks as in the scenario of no regulatory capital requirements with the former implying 
an overall upper limit on leverage for the total loan book, and a potential contraction of this, but without 
distinction between the asset classes.  In contrast, one of our main findings is that what was a less than 
rigid preference among banks in favour of mortgages and against loans to SMEs, has become a veritable 
mecca of what Jordà et. al (2016)  have called ‘mortgaging up’ after the introduction of favourable risk 
weights on mortgages in Basel II. Of course, there has not been the aggressive capital arbitrage by banks 
either through remote or synthetic securitization (see, Blundell-Wignall-Smith and Poulet (2013)) in the 
post 2009 period of APP. Our results are consistent with the empirical findings that during the course of 
APP, the assumption that banks extended mortgages only in response to the slack caused by big firms 
reducing bank loans as bond yields fell, is a good one.  Indeed, Section 4.2 shows that this expansion in 
mortgage loans by UK loans under Scenario 3 Basel II/III risk weight rules came at the expense of loans to 
SMEs.  Further, the growth of UK mortgage lending was not sufficient to counter the decline in business 
loans, thereby representing the main cause of the shrinkage in total bank lending. 
It is envisaged that the data driven agent based model of the UK banking sector will be extended in a 
modular fashion to encompass a more explicit characterization of the Brunnermeir and Sannikov (2012) 
stealth recapitalization of banks in low interest rate regimes that fuel a financial asset price boom and 
also the search for yield carry trades involving emerging market countries financed by UK banks. An 
additional ACE extension is needed to fully model big PNFC behaviours regarding their option to use 
funds from bond issuance to buy back shares or repay loans, which is beyond the scope of the current 
model which is focussed on the bank lending channel.12 As will be explained in the literature survey, 
though not fully exploited yet, this category of ACE models which we called ‘modular plug-ins’ can be 
built via extensions that alter the endogenous/exogenous demarcation, viz. by endogenizing or modelling 
more elaborate behaviours (than just if then rule) for agents in certain sectors that were considered to be 
exogenous in the extant ACE model.  The ACE approach can do this better than other modelling 
                                                             
12 That funds from bond issuance have also been used to buy back shares by US and UK companies has been highlighted in the financial press 
(see Reuters, Sept 2013, Yahoo Finance 2016, Washington Post, 2018) and by academics (see Gordon (2018), Jesse and Wang (2018)) as a 
matter of great concern about the malaise relating to stock market bubbles, corporate indebtedness and slow growth.  
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techniques with the modeller creating exogenous data feeds to the model agents in a time specific way 
while focussing on specific behaviours and not others.  
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 surveys the relevant literature. The 
agent-based approach used in the paper is outlined in Section 3 along with a full description of the 
model agents and their behaviours. Section 4 summarizes the ACE model initial conditions followed by 
the simulation outcomes and model validation results. Section 5 contains concluding remarks of the 
paper. 
2. The Related Literature 
This literature survey is divided into three subsections. The first gives a brief survey of the QE 
literature including that related to the Japanese QE introduced in 2001. The second section examines 
some of the main papers in the field of the impact of capital adequacy requirements on bank lending, 
especially, in recessions. In the last section, the literature of agent-based computational macroeconomics 
(ACME) is reviewed. 
2.1 The Impact of Quantitative Easing on Bank Lending 
Quantitative easing (QE) has been stimulating the academic literature since its introduction by the 
Bank of Japan (BoJ) in 2001, and in particular post GFC when the monetary authorities of the US, UK and 
EU started to pursue unconventional monetary policies. The main studies on QE focused on the influence 
of the massive asset purchases on asset yields and less so on the macroeconomic consequences and the 
impact on bank lending. First, while authors agree that asset purchases under QE have decreased the 
yields of government bonds (Kimura and Small (2004) for Japan, D’Amico and King (2011) for the US, and 
Daines, Joyce and Tong (2012) for the UK), the evidence on the impact on other assets yields has been 
mixed. Kimura and Small (2004) point out that BoJ asset purchases led to lower premiums on higher 
grade corporate bonds. This conclusion is supported by McLaren et al (2014) who argue that asset 
purchases under APP reduced gilts yield and, through local supply effects (asset purchases by BoE reduce 
the supply of gilts remaining for the private sector), the yields of corporate bonds. They claim that the 
expected asset purchases had a significant impact on yields after each announcement in March 2009, 
August 2009, and February 2012. Similar results for Fed’s LSAP programs are revealed by Gagnon et al. 
(2010). They show that the programs led to drops of 30 to 100 basis points in the risk premium component 
(rather than expectation component) of the longer-term yields. Conversely, Oda and Ueda (2005) show 
that the BoJ monetary policy at close to zero interest rate was effective in lowering the expectations 
component of interest rates. However, the portfolio rebalancing effects on the risk premium component 
were not significant. 
10 
 
The papers that analyse the effects on the wider economy generally specify a positive influence of QE 
on the real economy. For instance, Honda, Kuroki, and Tachibana (2007) and Harada and Masujima 
(2009) indicate that BoJ QE increased aggregate output through asset prices and bank reserves. This 
conclusion is supported by the results for US QE (Chen, Cúrdia, and Ferrero (2011) and Baumeister and 
Benati (2010)) and UK QE (Kapetanios et al. (2012)). However, the response and mechanics of bank 
lending to the QE program has received relatively less attention. For example, Bowman et al (2011) 
identify a positive but small impact of BoJ QE on bank lending. Joyce and Spaltro (2014) show similar 
outcomes for the BoE APP program. They claim that the effects were more important for smaller banks. 
2.2 Bank Lending and Capital Adequacy Requirements 
The influence of capital requirements on bank lending and bank behaviour has been investigated 
since the introduction of Basel rules in the late 1980s. Thakor (1996) inspects the role played by Basel 
capital rules in the developments in the US banking system in the early 1990s including the fall in 
aggregate bank lending and the increase in the share of government debt securities holding in the 
portfolios of US banks. He indicates that an expansionary monetary policy in the presence of capital 
requirements may either increase or decrease bank lending depending on the impact of the increasing 
money supply on the term structure of the interest rates.  Hans et al. (1999) point out that weakly 
capitalized banks tend to substitute away from assets with higher risk weights and to cut their total 
lending to enhance their capital ratios. These findings are supported by several authors13 including 
Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) who specify that banks with weaker capital ratios and greater 
dependence on market funding and non-interest income sources strongly decreased their lending during 
the crisis. Moreover, Heid, Porath and Stolz (2004) results show that a fall in capital buffers induces banks 
to rebuild them by raising capital and lowering risk-weighted assets by investing more in the safer assets 
and less of the riskier assets. However, although most of the literature focuses on the role of the supply 
of credit, some studies attribute the decreases in bank lending in recessions to demand factors. Berger 
and Udell (1994) investigate the causes of the reallocation of credit by U.S. commercial banks from loans 
to securities in the early 1990s. Their results indicate that while risk-related credit crunch hypotheses are 
not salient reasons for the fall in bank lending, demand-side impact on lending tend to be strong. More 
recently, Bikker and Hu (2012) argue that credit rationing in a cyclical downturn is not driven by a 
shortage in bank capital as the capital crunch hypothesis suggests. They show that while the demand 
factors dominate the market, the preeminent loans supply variables (bank capital and reserves) tend to 
be insignificant determinants of bank lending. 
                                                             
13 For example, Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), Rime (2001), and Furfine (2000). 
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As many of these papers rely on econometric analysis, conclusions such as weakly capitalized firms 
switch to lower risk weighted assets is highlighted as an individually rational thing to reduce capital 
requirements, few papers take this forward as part of the macro-economic framework. Despite an 
influential survey of Furfine et.al (1999) that asks hard questions regarding whether the Basel regulatory 
framework led to systematic trends in bank lending and in particular the role of perverse incentives 
flagged out in detail in Jones (2010) in the form of capital arbitrage, few macroeconomic models aim to 
include the incentives and constraints posed by Basel rules for the macroscopic implications of this for  
the wider problem that banks are lending less and less to non-financial corporations, especially to SMEs. 
As noted in the introduction, this paper follows this route.  In Markose et. al. (2012), an agent based 
model similar in the data driven formulation of the model in this paper, found that the big US banks were 
involved in a CDS carry trade in the run up to the 2007 GFC, but without the favorable 20% risk weight 
from synthetic securitization that permitted banks to reduce capital from 8% on bank assets to 1.6 % with 
the 20% risk weight that follows from the adoption of credit risk transfer by holding of CDS from AAA 
guarantors (like AIG), the extremely high levels of leverage on balance sheets of US FDIC big banks could 
not have been achieved.  Likewise, Acharya and Steffan (2013) gives the following analysis for the 
Eurozone crisis as a case of regulatory capital arbitrage due to Basel II regulations, which assign a zero-
risk weight for investments in sovereign debt. They argue that governments themselves could have had 
incentives to preserve the zero-risk weight in order to increase demand for high risk sovereign debt. 
Acharya and Steffan (2013) state that “Undercapitalized banks, that is, banks with low Tier 1 capital 
ratios, have incentives to increase short-term return on equity by shifting their portfolios into the 
highest-yielding assets with the lowest risk weights in an attempt to meet regulatory capital 
requirements without having to issue economic capital (regulatory capital arbitrage)”.  As will be 
pointed out in the next section, an ACE model is well placed to test out perverse incentives that lead to 
destabilizing effects of policy. 
2.3 Agent-Based Computational (ACE) Macroeconomics 
The study of the economy by means of ACME and network analysis is a relatively new field. It also 
represents a suitable approach to respond to the criticisms of the generic representative agent model of 
mainstream macroeconomic models14. Macroeconomists have been accused of a heavy dependence on 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models that are built around special cases where market 
inefficiencies are not possible (Stiglitz (2011)) and institutional details and financial interconnections in 
                                                             
14DelliGatti et. al. (2008,2010), Arthur (2006), Buiter (2009)Wieland (2010), Stiglitz (2011), Kirman (2006, 2010), Collander et. al  ( 2009), among 
others. 
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the provision of liquidity, capital adequacy,  solvency  and contagion based negative externalities are 
ignored (Markose (2013)). Critics of the standard macro models have targeted the equilibrium 
assumption that not only nets out all private credit, these models cannot incorporate herd behaviour and 
network effects, Akerlof (2002), and also carry trades from perverse incentives that result in destabilising  
phenomena in the real world, Colander et. al ( 2009). 
For our purposes existing ACME models can be classified into two main categories: those that 
produce qualitative results and those that are data driven. The bulk of the ACME involves qualitative 
models in which stylized boom bust dynamics are produced. This can be done by relaxing rational 
expectations and using adaptive learning or explicit herding behaviours (see Gaffeo et. al. 2008). Lengnick 
(2011) gives a simple baseline model. A recent survey of the ACEME is given in Dawid and Delligatti 
(2018).   
In the second category of ACME, we have those purported to represent massive real economy 
models. Models such as EURACE and ASPEN projects (Chan and Stiglitz (2008)) attempt to, respectively, 
simulate the entire EU and US economies. These models have been used to investigate the impact of 
policy interventions in the US and the Euro Area. For example, Teglio, Raberto and Cincotti (2013) use the 
EURACE environment to assess the impact of capital adequacy requirements on the wider economy. They 
perform simulations over a 40-year period and examine the short, medium and long run implications of 
different levels of capital adequacy ratios. Their results show a non-trivial impact of capital adequacy 
ratios on GDP, the unemployment rate and the aggregate capital stock. They also point out that this 
influence of the capital adequacy ratios arises from the credit channel, and varies significantly depending 
on the time span of the evaluation period.  
        The subset of the data based ACE and the most recent category, including the model of this paper, 
follow the approach suggested by Markose (2013) and it is closest in spirit to the BoE agent based model 
for the UK mortgage market of Battista et. al (2016).The specificity of institutional details and policy 
conditions are finely modelled to analyze the responses of the relevant economic agents.  Micro level 
data sets for the economy are used to calibrate the model agents and flow of funds constraints are 
strictly adhered to. In other words, the endogenous/exogenous demarcation can be made in ACE models 
with the relevant exogenous actual data that can be specified as ‘data agents’ that can feed into or 
inform the model agents in ways specified by the modeller.  In Markose et. al  (2012), the ACE model was 
used to see the consequences of the credit risk transfer rule in Basel II that gave a 20% risk weight to 
bank assets that had AAA guarantors providing CDS cover. It is argued that rule following behaviour as in 
complying with the regulation and availing of the full extent of its incentives, and also the conduct of 
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carry trade activities are relatively easy to implement in ACE. This is because unlike fully fledged 
adaptive behaviour, agents’ strategies, intelligence and autonomy are limited to following the letter of 
the law and strictly verifying conditions for which the most profitable arbitrage applies and also tracking 
the resulting self-reflexive deterioration of the risk in bank assets as agents herd into them. Stress tests 
for perverse incentives of policy are among the easiest of multi-agent exercises and it should be de 
rigueur in macro-prudential policy in order that flawed policies do not get perpetuated. 
3. Methodology of Data Driven Agent-based Model of UK Bank Lending 
3.1 Data Characteristics of Agents 
We model the developments in bank lending in the UK after the introduction of APP in 2009 using an 
ABM with four classes of agents: households (HHs), big firms (BFs), small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) and banks (Bs)). The UK economy data for each of these classes of agents around the launch of 
APP in 2009, described below and also in the Appendix, is used as empirical basis of the initial conditions 
both for the numbers of agents in each class and also for relevant balance sheet data of agents for the 
ACE model. The latter is purported to simulate agents’ interactions in the UK bank lending markets on a 
monthly basis for a period of 50 months from the advent of the BoE APP in 2009. 
Our approach can be divided into five main steps.  Firstly, our data driven ACE methodology is 
innovative in proposing a scale factor for the ABM and the real economy.  The size of agent classes is set 
in a way that replicates the actual sizes of agent populations in the UK based on data from the ONS, BoE 
financial statistics, Nationwide, and The Money Charity around the launch of APP in March 2009.We 
implement a proportional scaling factor calculated using the actual sizes of the UK households and 
nonfinancial business populations as follows. The number of households with at least one adult working 
in 2009 was 21.46 million15.  Additionally, in 2009 there were 4.923 million businesses, 99.9% (i.e. 4.918 
million) of which were SMEs16 and the remaining (i.e. 0.005 million) were BFs. This indicates proportions 
of 0.229 and 0.00024 between the number of SMEs and BFs, respectively, and the number of HHs. Hence, 
since the number of HHs in the ABM is set to 100,000, the numbers of SMEs and BFs will be set to 22,900 
and 24, respectively.  As for banks, the data on 10 largest UK banks that account for over 87% of bank 
lending is used.   
We will briefly describe how the incomes of the 100,000 HHs in the ABM are set to represent the UK 
income distribution for 2009.  This is needed for the purpose of modelling HHs’ mortgage affordability 
                                                             
15 In 2009, there were 25.83 million households where 16.9% of them were without work (i.e. with no adult working). The model assumes that 
only households with a working adult are eligible for mortgages to buy houses.  
16 Small and Medium Enterprise Statistics for the UK and Regions; Enterprise Directorate; The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
(BIS); Available at:http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110920151722/http:/stats.bis.gov.uk/ed/sme/index.htm 
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used by banks as a lending criterion.  We simulate the income distribution for the 100,000 model 
household agents from the UK income distribution given in deciles in Figure 3 below from the 
Department of work and Pensions. We combine the data from the latter with that from the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies (IFS)17. IFS estimates the average weekly income of a household in the 2008-09 financial 
year was £560.64 (an equivalent of £2,429.43 per month18) with 50% of the households making £450.52 
or less a week (or £1,951.84 a month) and about 3.6 million or 16.7% of households earning over £1000 
per week (or £4,333.33 per month). Note, for purposes of modelling HHs mortgage affordability used by 
banks as a lending criterion, we use the deciles given in Figure 3 below based on the monthly equivalents 
of the weekly income data.  
Figure 3: The Probability Distribution of Household Weekly Income (2008-09) 
 
                    Source: Households below average income (HBAI): 1994/95 to 2008/09; P.15; Department for Work and Pensions; 
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/households-below-average-income-hbai-199495-to-200809 
ONS home ownership and renting data19 indicates that 64% of homes in the UK are owner-occupied 
(the remaining 36% of homes are rented), and that about 52% of the homeowners have mortgage 
obligations.  This yields the probability distribution for the number of houses per household in the initial 
period as follows. Of the 64% of home owners, we assume an equal 16% probability that they can own up 
to 4 additional houses.  The value of the average UK mortgage peaked at about £50,000 in 2007 Q4 and 
then fell below £48,000 in 2010 Q2, taking 4 years till 2013 to recover to the pre-crisis peak. The UK 
                                                             
17Institute for Fiscal Studies:  Inequality and Poverty Spreadsheet which “provides data on British living standards, inequality and poverty” 
available at: http://www.ifs.org.uk/tools_and_resources/incomes_in_uk. 
18 Monthly income = Weekly Income x 52 (weeks a year) / 12 (months a year). 
16This can be found at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/detailed-characteristics-on-housing-for-local-authorities-in-
england-and-wales/short-story-on-detailed-characteristics.html. 
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average house price peaked at about £180,000 in 2007 Q2, which then fell to below £158,000 in 2008Q4 
and then recovering to the pre-crisis peak by 2014 Q1.20    
Second, each agent is given a balance sheet representing its initial conditions in 2009 Q1.  ONS data 
indicates that cash holdings of households represented about 14.43% of their total assets at the end of 
200821 while the cash holdings of non-financial businesses at that date represented about 12.83% of their 
total assets. At initial date BFs and SMEs are respectively assigned bank loans averaging 31.87% and 40% 
of their total liabilities, while BFs are shown to have bond stock valued at 19.79% of their total liabilities.     
BFs are assigned physical capital by using a uniform distribution over the range of £5 million to £100 
billion of physical capital.  We take the ONS data for 2009 for UK Gross Capital Stock22, which is £2202.6 
billion and therefore has an average value of about £447 million for the 4.923 million UK businesses.  
Hence, our distribution implies big firm capital to be highly skewed with over 50% of BFs with capital in 
excess of £50bn.  In contrast, we assume the SME physical capital distribution to range from £50,000 to 
£1 million.  Finally, in the case of data for banks, the exact relevant items of the balance sheets of the 10 
largest UK banks in 2009 (see Appendix Figure A.2) are used.  
In step three, households and non-financial firms are allocated to the 10 banks using relevant 
probability distributions. For instance, each of the UK banks is assigned 10,000 households as customers, 
distributed according to the income deciles given in Figure 3 using monthly equivalents.  Likewise, a 
similar distribution is made for BFs and SMEs as customers of the 10 UK banks.  The 10 banks then receive 
a horizontal sum of deposits and make loans based on the above customer assignment.   
In the fourth step, the behavioural rules of the agents are defined.  This constitutes the main engine 
of the ABM and is described in detail in Section 3.2.  These rules describe the responses of the agents to 
different developments. For instance, a big firm responds to a fall in the cost of bond issuance by 
replacing part of its bank loans with bonds. Then, in the fifth step of the process, 50 simulations are run 
for the three different scenarios for bank behaviour to investigate the role played by Basel capital 
adequacy rules in conjunction with the BF response to falling bond yields with APP.  At the end of this 
stage, the values of bank lending aggregates to households and nonfinancial businesses are simulated for 
each of the 50 months. Finally, the simulated bank lending aggregates are rescaled up and compared to 
the actual UK bank lending aggregates for purposes of model validation. 
                                                             
17 Source: Nationwide House Price Index (http://www.nationwide.co.uk/about/house-price-index/download-data#xtab:uk-series). 
21 This is calculated by taking the ratio of the sum of households’ currency and deposits (£1,172.47 billion) with the sum of households’ financial 
liabilities and net worth at the end of 2008 (£1,550.13 billion and £6,573.64 billion respectively).  The latter two yield the total assets of the 
household sector from the ONS Sectoral Financial Accounts. 
22 This can be found at https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/uksectoraccounts/datasets/capitalstock 
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3.2 The ACE Model 
The model of this paper outlined in Figure 4 has an the endogenous segment (the dashed area in 
Figure 4), which is embedded within the wider economy where the relevant variables relating to the 
central bank, labour market, goods and services market, housing market, and capital markets are taken to 
be exogenous.  
Figure 4: Representation of the Agent-based Model of UK Bank Lending 
 
 
Notes: The components inside the dashed area correspond to agent behaviours that are endogenous, while the data for the rest 
will be supplied exogenously. The latter includes asset yields, the income and consumption expenditure of households, house 
prices, the physical capital and operating profits of businesses. HHs: households; BFs: big nonfinancial companies; SMEs: small 
and medium enterprises   
 
Following the assignment of non-bank agents within the endogenous dashed segment as customers 
of banks, both banks and non-banks make their respective decisions whilst responding to the 
exogenously given data from outside the dashed segment in Figure 4.  HHs and businesses deposit cash in 
their assigned banks. HHs and businesses also seek to obtain mortgages and bank loans, respectively, as 
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conditions permit from their assigned banks. This implies that the assets and liabilities in the balance 
sheet of any bank are the horizontal sums of the corresponding assets and liabilities in the balance sheets 
of the agents who are assigned to this bank. For example, the amount of deposits on the liabilities side of 
a bank’s balance sheet is the sum of the deposits of all HHs, BFs, and SMEs who are the customers of this 
bank. 
Nonfinancial firms (BFs and SMEs) employ physical capital and cash to operate and finance their 
operations using a mixture of debt financing and equity. The amount of initial physical capital (and total 
assets) briefly described above and in the Appendix defines the firm’s size which, in turn, determines its 
accessibility to different debt markets. While SMEs are restricted to bank borrowing, BFs can also issue 
debt securities. Banks accept deposits of HHs, BFs and SMEs, and provide loans in the form of mortgages 
to households and business loans to BFs and SMEs. A further description of the initial conditions of the 
agents and the behaviour of these agents over the simulation period will be presented in the next 
sections. 
3.3 Agents’ Behaviours 
This section will set out the responses of the model agents to the developments in their surrounding 
environment and the subsequent interactions of one another within the endogenous segment of Figure 
4. According to Daines, Joyce and Tong (2012), the first round of BoE purchases caused a 100 basis 
points fall in gilts yields. Hence, the impact of BoE’s APP is introduced into the model by allowing gilts 
rate to decrease by 2.5 basis points each period. This fall in gilts yield accompanied by the low policy rate 
results in changes in the relative cost of corporate bonds and consequently has significant implications for 
BFs. The reaction of banks to this fall in BFs’ borrowing depends on the capital adequacy regime in 
operation. Hence, the behaviour of banks is investigated under three scenarios that reflect three possible 
capital requirements regimes. The latter influences the lending behaviour of banks to households and 
SMEs. 
3.3.1 Households Behaviour  
We assume each household earns an income and accumulates its wealth at each period only in the 
form of houses and cash deposited with its assigned bank. The demand for mortgages is governed by HH 
incomes.  It is assumed that HHs’ incomes fluctuates by 0.275%  each month in line with inflation 
between March 2009 and March 2013 as average annual inflation rate in the UK was 3.3% during that 
period.  
 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 × (1 +
0.033
12
) (1) 
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Here,   𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖,𝑡  is the income of household i in period t. 
We assume that HHs keep constant their expenditure habits of spending between 66% -70% of income 
on consumption.23 The remaining 30%-34% of income is added to HH cash reserves, which are used to 
pay the mortgage obligations (mortgage principal and interest) and to cover the deposit if a new 
mortgage is obtained. Denoting housing wealth of household i in period t as 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖,𝑡  , it can grow only 
with a new house purchase based with the allocation of a new mortgage denoted by , 𝑁𝑀𝑖,𝑡, to 
household i in period t with a 5% loan to value ratio in the benchmark simulation: 
 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 +
1
0.95
× 𝑁𝑀𝑖,𝑡  . (2) 
 
The conditions regarding whether a HH makes a mortgage application and the acceptance of the same by 
the bank it is assigned to, is determined in part as follows.   A HH who is a first time buyer is given a 
higher probability of making a mortgage application of 30% compared to that of a 20% probability for 
those who already own one. In the eligibility criteria, HH disposable income or cash at time after 
mortgage payments is denoted as 𝐻𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡, and  𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡  is the mortgage repayment made by household i to 
their bank in period t.  This is given in (3), with 𝑃𝑃𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐼𝑃𝑖,𝑡, respectively, denoting  principal and 
interest parts of the mortgage payment and given in (4) . 
𝐻𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + 0.3 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖,𝑡 −
0.05
0.95
𝑁𝑀𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡  (3) 
 
 𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑃𝑖,𝑡  (4) 
Here, mortgage principal repayments and interest payments are calculated as in (5) and (6).          
 𝑃𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =
0.95
360
× 𝑁𝑜𝑀𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐻𝑃𝑡−1, (5) 
 
 𝐼𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑟𝐻𝐻,𝑡−1
12
× 𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1  . (6) 
 
Note, 𝐻𝑃𝑡: house price in period t; 𝑁𝑜𝑀𝑖,𝑡: the number of mortgages owed by household i in period t; 
𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑖,𝑡: the mortgage indebtedness of household i in period t; 𝑟𝐻𝐻,𝑡: interest rate on mortgages in period 
t.  In equation (7), we denote 𝑀𝐸𝑙𝑔𝑖,𝑡  as the indicator for mortgage eligibility of household i in its 
application for a new mortgage in period t and 𝑀𝐴𝑣𝑏(𝑖),𝑡 is an indicator for new mortgages which 
                                                             
23 This is in keeping with the UK consumption to GDP ratio.  In 2009 this was around 66.134%, see 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.PETC.ZS?locations=GB.  We randomly assign the 100,000 households to have a consumption to 
income ratio in the range of 66%-70%. 
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determines whether the bank assigned to household i  is willing to lend. The value of this indicator will be 
derived from the bank behaviour described below. These minimum requirements employed by the banks 
are given in (7).  To obtain a new mortgage, banks require the applicant HH to have a disposable 
income, 𝐻𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1, that  is at  least twice the down payment or the deposit (5% of the house price  (0.05 ×
𝐻𝑃𝑡) and have no more than 5 mortgages.  Further, mortgage payment in the coming month should be 
no more than 40% of HH income, viz. 𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1  ≤ 0.4 ×  𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖,𝑡 in (7). 
 
𝑀𝐸𝑙𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐻𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 ≥ 2 × 0.05 × 𝐻𝑃𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1  ≤ 0.4 × 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖,𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑁𝑜𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 < 5
0 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
}. (7) 
 
Thus, the value of the new mortgage, 𝑁𝑀𝑖,𝑡 , is given in (8) as the house price less deposit if the 
conditions in (7) are met under the proviso that the bank is able to do so.   
 
𝑁𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = {
𝐻𝑃𝑡 × (1 − 0.05)                 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐴𝑣𝑏(𝑖),𝑡 = 1, 𝑀𝐸𝑙𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 1  
0                                                             𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                
}. (8) 
 
Equation (10) gives the HH net worth or equity at time t,  𝐻𝐻𝐸𝑖,𝑡  , as its housing wealth plus cash assets 
less mortgage debt , 𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑖,𝑡 , which is defined in (9) as the mortgage debt in period t-1 less principal and 
interest payment in t plus new mortgage at t: 
 𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑁𝑀𝑖,𝑡  (9) 
 
 𝐻𝐻𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐻𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑖,𝑡 . (10) 
 
3.3.2 Big Firms (BFs) Behaviour  
As stated earlier, BoE’s APP decreases the cost of corporate bonds which triggers portfolio 
rebalancing. This induces BFs to replace part of their bank loans with corporate bonds and this section 
will specify the behavioural rule that BFs will use for this.  The model assumes that BFs keep the size of 
physical capital and total debt unchanged, issue no new equity, and maintain a constant annual operating 
profit (i.e. profit before interest payments) to total assets ratio of 10%.24  In each period, a BF chooses the 
                                                             
24 A 10% annual return on gross fixed capital stock for UK PNFCs is a good assumption.  Data on annual Rates of Return for PNFCs  given by ONS 
is estimated as gross operating surplus (numerator) on gross fixed capital stock (denominator) and can be found at Table 1: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/uksectoraccounts/datasets/profitabilityofukcompaniesreferencetable.  In 2009 this was 
10.8% and in years pertinent to our analysis, it was around 11.6%.   
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debt financing mixture to improve its net profit (𝜋𝑖,𝑡) which is the difference between its operating profit 
(𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑖,𝑡) and the cost of debt financing: 
 
 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵𝐹𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑆,𝑡 . 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝑑𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝐵𝐹,𝑡 . 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝐿𝑖,𝑡 . (11) 
 
Here, 𝑟𝑆,𝑡  and 𝑟𝐵𝐹,𝑡: the interest rates on bonds and bank loans, respectively, in period t; 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝑑𝑖,𝑡: the 
amount outstanding of BF i’s bonds in period t; 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝐿𝑖,𝑡: the amount of bank loans owed by big firm i in 
period t. The comparisons between bank borrowing and corporate bond issuance are based on the 
interest costs of the two sources. BFs will respond to decreases in bonds interest rate (rS), when it 
becomes equal to or smaller than the interest rate on bank borrowing (rBF), by issuing more bonds and 
using the proceeds to repay part of their bank loans. In other words, the debt mixture of BFs is 
restructured towards more corporate debt and less bank loans on average during the APP period.25 
Note, the exogenous components of a BF balance sheet in any period t to do with physical capital and 
gross operating profits of BFs will be anchored in empirical data. Equation (12) states that the physical 
capital of the BF, 𝐵𝐹𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑖,𝑡  , remains unchanged from one period to the next, anchored by the initial 
distribution,   
 𝐵𝐹𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵𝐹𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1. (12) 
 
Equation (13) states the assumption that BF gross operating profits grow at empirically relevant rates in 
terms of its physical capital at time t:26  
 𝐵𝐹𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 0.10 × (𝐵𝐹𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1). (13) 
 
The BF cash holdings, 𝐵𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 , is net of the interest payments on its corporate bonds and bank loans:  
 
 𝐵𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝐹𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑆,𝑡 . 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑟𝐵𝐹(𝑡). 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1. (14) 
 
                                                             
25 In a future edition of our ACE model, the extent to which funds raised by BFs from bonds are apportioned between repayment of bank loans 
and share repurchases will be modeled more explicitly. An explicit BF model that maximizes earnings per share (EPS) or net profits divided by 
the number of shares outstanding indicates that the return on capital, ROE, can be increased either by increasing net profits (lowering the debt  
cost in our analysis) or reducing the number of shares outstanding through share repurchases or buybacks. Given the complex issues involved 
here, see footnote 9, a fuller model for big firm behavior that relates to maximizing shareholder value and on the debt/equity struct ure is 
beyond the scope of this ACE model.   
26 A 10% annual return on gross fixed capital stock for UK PNFCs is a good assumption.  Data on Rates on Returns for PNFCs given at ONS is 
estimated as gross operating surplus (numerator) on gross fixed capital stock (denominator) and can be found at 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/uksectoraccounts/datasets/profitabilityofukcompaniesreferencetable.  In 2009 this was 
10.8% and in years pertinent to our analysis, it was around 11.6%.   
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The change in the debt composition of big firm i in period t, ∆𝐵𝐹𝐷𝐶𝑖,𝑡, which is key to the portfolio 
balancing response to the lower yield on debt as a result of APP is given as follows in the behavioural 
rule (15).  The status quo, with bank loans favoured over bond issuance, is maintained if, as stated in 
(15), the bond yield, rS,t is greater than interest on bank loans, rBF,t.  If the opposite is the case, BFs 
reduce their bank loans by upto 1.45% 27 as follows: 
 
 ∆𝐵𝐹𝐷𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = {
0                     𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑆,𝑡 ≥ 𝑟𝐵𝐹,𝑡
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚[−0.014598;  0]                     𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑆,𝑡 < 𝑟𝐵𝐹,𝑡
} (15) 
 
 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∆𝐵𝐹𝐷𝐶𝑖,𝑡 (16) 
 
𝐵𝐹𝐵𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 − ∆𝐵𝐹𝐷𝐶𝑖,𝑡  . (17) 
 
Hence, the net worth or equity of firms, 𝐵𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡 , is given as : 
 
 𝐵𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵𝐹𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐵𝐹𝐵𝑑𝑖,𝑡 . (18) 
 
3.3.3 Bank Lending Behaviour  
As indicated, new bank lending for mortgages and to SMEs is driven by the portfolio rebalancing 
implemented by BFs in response to APP induced lower bond yields. We assume that banks do not issue 
new externally financed equity, and do not distribute any dividends and hence avail of new equity only 
from retained earnings or as relevant by changing the composition of its risk weighted assets.  Banks aim 
to smooth their total stock of lending to HHs and non-financial firms and if they suffer reduced loan 
demand or increased loan repayments by BFs, they will attempt to compensate this by lending more to 
HHs for mortgages or to SMEs subject to capital constraints and perceived credit risks. To investigate the 
impact of regulatory capital adequacy requirements, the ACE model implements three different 
scenarios: no capital requirements, a Basel I simple  capital requirements where equity capital is a fixed 
8% proportion of total lending, and the more complex case where equity capital satisfies a ratio of risk 
weighted assets. The main behavioural difference that the introduction of Basel rules have brought about 
is an addition of risk weights to the  banks’ use of credit risk estimates on an ad hominem basis in the pre 
                                                             
27This is a historically relevant maximum fall in bank loans in a month for non-financial firms.  
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Basel regime.28 This involves an institutionalized implementation of a Basel compliant cost of capital 
measure.  In summary : To track the impact of a QE-generated fall in demand for bank loans by BFs, banks 
change their portfolio of loans only to optimally accommodate the slack in demand in the total lending 
due to big firm substitution away from bank loans. 
3.3.3.1 Scenario I: No Capital Requirements 
In this scenario, banks do not have regulatory equity capital requirements. A bank grants mortgages 
and loans to SMEs to maximize its profit B,t , which is given by the following equation: 
 
  , , , , , ,. . .   B t i t i t i t i t i tr L s L L  (19) 
Here i = {BF, HH, SME}: the agent class; Li,t: bank lending to agent of loan class i at time t; ri,t: interest 
rate on class i loan at time t; si,t(Li,t): default risk cost of class i loan at time t (i.e. the probability that an 
debtor of class i loan defaults) which increases in the amount of lending to agents for class i loans. We 
assume that the default risk costs are quadratic, si,t(Li,t)= Li,t2. As discussed earlier, banks proxy the default 
risk for each class of loans in terms of the non-performing loans at each time t reported as write offs by 
UK banks for the loan class (see Appendix Figure A.1). In equations (20) and (21), the optimal amounts of 
mortgages and loans to SMEs are determined by the difference between own interest rate and the 
interest rate on the other class of loans (rHH and rSME), the ratio of the default risk of the other loan 
product to the total default risk of both loan products and the amount available for investment in the two 
types (i.e. the amount of total lending minus loans to BFs ).  In other words, the second condition implies 
that banks increase bank loans to the one class, when the default risk on the other class increases, ceteris 
paribus.  In order to keep the basic assumption of portfolio rebalancing for banks the same for all 
scenarios, we assume that banks aim to keep the amount of total lending, aggregated over the three 
categories of loans fixed,29 (𝐿𝑇𝑜𝑡 = 𝐿𝐵𝐹,𝑡 + 𝐿𝐻𝐻,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐸,𝑡), and they only aim to reallocate optimally 
between HHs and SMEs of what remains the target loan total after adjusting for the wholly demand 
determined BF loan. We have the optimal amount of bank loans to households for mortgages, 𝐿∗𝐻𝐻,𝑡  , 
and SME loans , 𝐿∗𝑆𝑀𝐸,𝑡, in (20) and (21), respectively : 
30 
   
 
, , , , ,*
,
, ,
2
2
HH t SME t SME t Tot t BF t
HH t
HH t SME t
r r s L L
L
s s
  


   (20) 
                                                             
28 For purposes of the ACE model, note that default risk is not assessed on the basis of individual loans, but on the class of loans for which 
empirical data is used.  
29 This is subject to the capital adequacy conditions in Scenarios 2 and 3.  
30Note given the assumptions made, the optimal lending equations in (20) and (21) are obtained from the profit function given as 
𝜋𝐵.𝑡 =   𝑟𝐵𝐹,𝑡𝐿𝐵𝐹,𝑡  +   𝑟𝐻𝐻,𝑡𝐿𝐻𝐻,𝑡 +  𝑟𝑆𝑀𝐸,𝑡(𝐿𝑇𝑜𝑡 −  𝐿𝐵𝐹,𝑡 − 𝐿𝐻𝐻,𝑡) −   𝑠𝐵𝐹,𝑡𝐿𝐵𝐹,𝑡 
2   − 𝑠𝐻𝐻,𝑡𝐿𝐻𝐻,𝑡 
2 −  𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐸,𝑡(𝐿𝑇𝑜𝑡,𝑡 −  𝐿𝐵𝐹,𝑡 − 𝐿𝐻𝐻,𝑡)
2.
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   (21) 
The first result here is that the banks operate without an explicit cost of capital, and  even if there are 
larger default costs on loans to SMEs in (20), 𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐸,𝑡 > 𝑠𝐻𝐻,𝑡 , this need not imply a natural bias toward 
mortgage loans as rSME could be sufficiently greater than rHH.  However, equations (20) and (21) indicate 
that a fall in loans to BFs, viz 𝐿𝐵𝐹,𝑡 <  0 , driven by the lower bond yields, could induce banks to 
increase their supply of mortgages to HHs to a greater extent than loans to SMEs as the rates of default in 
the latter are typically higher than the former.  As shown in Appendix 1, in 2009 Q1 the write offs on 
mortgages, which is used to proxy default risk, far exceeded that on SME loans. However, over the period 
of the start of APP to 2014, SME loan write offs increased while those for mortgages fell.  Thus, when BF 
loans fall, whether or not banks increase SME loans more relative to household mortgages are governed 
by the respective comparative static conditions, which we denote as ɵHH and ɵSME , involving the relevant 
credit risk on the other loan: 
, ,
, , ,
0
 
  
 
HH t SME t
HH
BF t HH t SME t
L s
L s s
, (22) 
  
, ,
, , ,
0
 
  
 
SME t HH t
SME
BF t HH t SME t
L s
L s s
. (23) 
 
Equations (22) and (23) imply that in Scenario 1, banks will increase both mortgages and SME loans 
in response to a slack created by the fall in BF loans, 𝐿𝐵𝐹,𝑡 <  0.Hence, each bank follows the 
following optimal rules when deciding the supply of new loans (∆𝐿𝐻𝐻,𝑡, and ∆𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐸,𝑡): 
 *, , , 1 ,    HH t HH t HH t HH BF tL L L L , (24) 
 
 *, , , 1 ,    SME t SME t SME t SME BF tL L L L . (25) 
 
Equations (24) and (25) combine the optimal loan levels ( *
,HH tL and 
*
,SME tL ) given in equations (20) and 
(21) along with the impact of changes in BF demand for banks loans given in equations (22) and (23).   
 
3.3.3.2 Scenario II: Simple Capital Requirements with No Risk Weights 
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To introduce the capital adequacy requirements, which state that at least a fraction γReq of bank 
assets must be financed by equity, into the model, we follow Aliaga-Díaz, Olivero, and Powell (2011) who 
state that if a bank has insufficient capital, it is subject to a cost that increases with the distance between 
the required capital to asset ratio and the actual one. Hence, the profit function of a bank in this case 
becomes: 
    , , , , , , ,
1 1
. . . .log .  
 
  
        
  
 B t i t i t i t i t i t Tot t
t req
r L s L L L . (26) 
 
Here E: bank equity capital; 1
,
.  
 
  
 
t
Tot t
E
L
: the cost of equity capital per £1 of total lending; σ: the cost 
of equity capital estimated by using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)31.  In the last term in (26), 
which we denote by 𝛽 = 𝜇. 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (1
𝛾
−
1
𝛾𝑟𝑒𝑞
), is the cost of having insufficient equity or the cost of 
noncompliance with the capital rules, and we can aggregate these costs     , as they apply to 
total lending.  Note 1/ is the leverage, which in the case of 8% capital ratio, is 12.5.  The main change in 
the banks’ calculation of the profitability of loans as compared to the case of a simple regulatory capital 
requirement is the direct cost of equity, , in (26) and also the penalty for deviations from the Basel 
approved leverage. The operational aspects of the binding capital constraints are governed by the μ 
which is an indicator function in Equation (26) the values for which are defined as follows: 
 𝜇 = {
1        𝑖𝑓 𝛾𝑡 < 0.08
0                     𝑖𝑓 0.10 ≥  𝛾𝑡 ≥ 0.08
0      𝑖𝑓 𝛾𝑡 > 0.10
} (27) 
 
 
In addition to the required equity to assets ratio (γReq) of 8%, an optional buffer of 2% is stipulated as in 
Repullo and Suarez (2013).  The cost of noncompliance with the capital rules is assumed to be very high 
and can lead to bank failure.  To avoid this high cost, banks try to keep equity to asset ratio very close to 
10%. In other words, each bank will change its total lending to ensure that equity to total lending ratio is  
between 8% and 10% (i.e. 8% <γt< 10%). This means that the upper bound of the feasible amount of total 
lending in any period t ( ,Tot tL ) which maintains the 10% equity to total lending is estimated: 
, 1 ,10  Tot t t i tL E L , if 8% <γt-1 < 10%  and  LTot,t#< ,Tot tL  if γt-1 < 8%. (28) 
 
                                                             
31For example, see Rizzi (2013). 
25 
 
Thus, total lending has to be reduced from ,Tot tL  if γt-1 < 8% and we will denote this as LTot,t
#. 
Accordingly, the profit function of the bank can be rewritten as follows: 
    , , , , , , ,
1 1
. . . .log .  
 
  
        
  
 B t i t i t i t i t i t Tot t
t req
r L s L L L . (29) 
 
As the total capital costs     , apply equally to every £1 lent irrespective of the category of 
loan, the optimal amounts of mortgages and loans to SMEs in this Scenario 2 ( highlighted with a double 
asterisks **) correspond with the result in Scenario (1) with the only difference being the upper bound 
and (the capital constrained lower bound ) of the total amount of lending being given by ,Tot tL in (28).  
      
 
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, , , , , , , , , ,**
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, , , ,
2 2
2 2
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HH t SME t HH t SME t
r r s L L r r s L L
L
s s s s
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 
 
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      
 
   
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, , , , , , , , , ,**
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, , , ,
2 2
2 2
SME t HH t HH t Tot t BF t SME t HH t HH t Tot t BF t
SME t
HH t SME t HH t SME t
r r s L L r r s L L
L
s s s s
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 
 
. 
    
(32) 
 
 
 
Equations (31) & (32) indicate that a fall in loans to BFs induces banks to increase its supply of 
mortgages and loans to SMEs using the comparative static conditions ɵHH and ɵSME (equations 22& 23) as 
in Scenario I. The behavioural rules a bank follows when deciding the supply of new loans to be granted 
(∆𝐿𝐻𝐻,𝑡, and ∆𝐿𝑆𝑀𝐸,𝑡) depend on the value of its equity to total lending in the previous period (γt-1). In 
this context, we distinguish between the three possible cases shown below. 
 Case A:ϻ = 0 and 8% < γt-1< 10%: 
In this case a bank will maintain its total lending unchanged, and will change the size of mortgages 
and loans to SMEs only if there was a change in the stock of its loans to BFs:  
 , ,.  HH t HH BF tL L , 
   
(33) 
 , ,.  SME t SME BF tL L . 
   
(34) 
Case B:ϻ = 0 and γt-1>10%: 
In this case, the bank has excess lending capacity that it can use to grant more mortgages and loans 
to SMEs. Consequently, analogous to Scenario I, the supply of new loans to be granted will be as follows: 
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 **, , , 1 ,HH t HH t HH t HH BF tL L L L     ,            (35) 
 
 **, , , 1 ,SME t SME t SME t SME BF tL L L L     .     (36) 
  
 
 
Case C: ϻ = 1 (or γt-1<8%): 
A bank facing this situation is over-lending and will decrease its total lending  to LTot,t# as noted in (28) 
to decrease the cost of noncompliance with the capital adequacy rules. The behavioural rules will follow 
(35) and (36) with LTot,t# providing the capital complaint upper bound for total loans given there.  
3.3.3.3 Scenario III: Complex Fractional Capital Requirements with Risk Weights 
Like Scenario II, banks are required to finance a fraction of their asset using equity capital. However, 
the capital requirements in Scenario III assign different risk weights to different types of assets following 
Basel II/III and the capital requirements take the form of an equity to risk weighted asset ratio specified in 
below in (37).   The profit function of a bank in this case takes the following formula, which is analogous 
to the non-risk weighted leverage ratio constraints on banks in (29), with the respective risk weighted 
equivalent terms for cost of capital  𝛿𝑖
# and the (reciprocal of) regulatory ratio, γReq#,  and actual capital 
ratios,  γ# : 
    #, , , , , , ,# #
1 1
. . . '.log .B t i t i i t i t i t i t Tot t
i req
r L s L L L  
 
  
        
  
  . (37) 
Here, actual leverage as given by risk weighted asset to equity is: 
 
, , ,
#
1 1
, , ,
. . .1 1
. . .
BF BF t HH HH t SME SME t
t t
BF BF t HH HH t SME SME t
w L w L w L
E E
w L w L w L
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 
 
 
. 
 
We denote, wBF<wHH<wSME: risk weights for loans to BFs, mortgages, and loans to SMEs, respectively; E: 
bank equity capital; 𝛿𝑖
# = 𝜎#. 𝑤𝑖 .
𝐸𝑡−1
𝐿𝑇𝑜𝑡,𝑡−1
: the cost of equity capital per £1 of lending to class i agents; σ#: 
the cost of equity capital estimated by using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM);  γReq#: the required 
equity to risk weighted assets ratio; γ#: the actual equity to risk weighted assets ratio; ϻ: is a positive 
parameter.    
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As in Scenario II, banks attempt to maintain equity to risk weighted assets ratio very close to 10%. 
Therefore, the behaviour of a bank in any period t depends on the value of its equity to risk weighted 
assets (γt#). Again, each bank will determine its total lending to ensure that 8% <γt#< 10%, which we will 
denote generically as ,Tot tL
# to cover the range of values this can take. 
The first order conditions with respect to mortgages and loans to SMEs show that, in addition to the 
relative yields and credit risk, the total amount available for mortgages and loans to SMEs, the risk 
weights and bank equity have a significant impact on the optimal allocation between the two types of 
loans:  
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(38) 
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In equations (38) and (39) for the optimal loan allocations for mortgages and SMES, the first term in 
numerator gives the extent to which the required risk weighted leverage defined in (37) deviates from 
the actual risk weighted leverage in terms of lending at t-1 for bank loans and the risk weighted allocation 
to the other loan class in terms of the slack in total loans after exogenous BF loan determination at t .  
The second term in the numerators of (38) and (39) are operative only if the indicator function in (27)  µ  
= 1 , viz. the bank is not capital constrained by the Basel II capital adequacy requirement.  The difference 
in rates of return between the two competing loan classes adjusted for their respective cost of capital 
and default risks feature in the denominator of the second terms in (38) and (39).  
Equations (40) & (41) indicate that a fall in loans to BFs (LBF) will induce banks to categorically increase 
mortgages, and to decrease loans to SMEs as per the following comparative statics: 
r
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> 0. (41) 
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Thus, unlike Scenarios I and II, in Scenario III, as seen in equation (41), as the comparative static term 
SME*** multiples the term representing the slack in total bank lending that is brought about by the 
portfolio rebalancing by BFs away from bank loans, with 𝐿𝐵𝐹,𝑡 <  0 this will not lead to any increase in 
SME lending as the differences in the administratively set risk weights given in (41) that are biased against 
SMEs, will militate against this.  Equation (41) gives the, ceteris paribus, rule of thumb that as loans to big 
firms are reduced , 𝐿𝐵𝐹,𝑡 <  0,  given the size of regulatory weights below, this yields a 60% reduction 
to SME loans for every £1 reduction in loans to big firms.  In contrast, the risk weights favouring 
mortgages in (40), results in 1.6 times expansion of mortgage loans for every £1 reduction in loans to big 
firms, subject to capital constraints.   
         In fact, in Case C (see Scenario II) when banks are under capitalized with  γt-1# < 8% , SMEs will now 
lose loan share as follows:   
DL
SME ,t
*** = -
1
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SME
. RWA
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æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷+ rSME
*** . DL
BF ,t( ) < 0.    (42) 
This is due to the first term in brackets in (42) being positive by definition of  γt-1# < 8%32 , and the second 
term is also negative from (41) when 𝐿𝐵𝐹,𝑡 <  0his is the negative double whammy that SMEs face 
in being frozen out of loans due to the bias in the Basel II weights against them, especially, when a bank is 
capital constrained. 
           The risk weights used in the model for different loan types are taken from BIPRU 3.4 Risk weights 
under the standardised approach to credit risk available Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). The value of 
these risk weights are as follows with wBF being the weights on corporate loans, wHH those on mortgages 
and wSME the 100% weights on loans to SMEs  : 
wBF wHH wSME 
20% 50% 100% 
                        Source: BIPRU 3.4 Risk weights under the standardised approach to credit risk; Financial Conduct Authority  
                                       (FCA); Available at: https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/BIPRU/3/4.html#D591 
 
3.3.4 SMEs Behaviour 
Like BFs, SMEs have a constant but lower annual operating profit to total assets ratio of 5%, and keep 
the size of physical capital fixed over the simulation period.  The main characteristic of SMEs is that they 
cannot control their debt financing (like BFs) since the single source of this financing is bank loans. The 
latter depend solely on banks’ willingness to grant loans or extend/renew current credit facilities to these 
                                                             
32 Note as γt-1# =  
𝐸𝑡−1
𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑡−1
< 0.08 , rewriting this, we see that 
𝐸𝑡−1
0.08
 < 𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑡−1. 
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firms. Additionally, the model assumes that SMEs have unlimited demand for debt financing and that 
they cannot raise further external equity financing during the simulation period. As shown above in 
Scenario III, the Basel II/III risk weight against SMEs loans imply that they cannot enjoy any increase in 
loans especially in the period of APP when BFs start to replace bank loans with bonds. This situation is 
more drastic when banks suffer capital inadequacy as shown in (42). Consequently, the components of a 
SME balance sheet in a given period t are as follows, respectively, for the physical capital of SME, 
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑖,𝑡 , and SME operating profits, 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑖,𝑡 , which is set in (44) at 5% of physical capital
33 and 
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 , the cash holdings of SME i in period t   : 
 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 (43) 
 
 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 0.05 × (𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1). (44) 
In (45),  𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 , the cash holdings of SME i in period t is given as the cash holdings in t-1,  its 
operating profits in t, less the interest on SME bank loans at t-1,  𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐵𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 ,  and the bank determined 
change in the amount of bank loans granted to SME i in period t, ∆𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐵𝐿𝑖,𝑡:  
 
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑆𝑀𝐸,𝑡𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐵𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∆𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐵𝐿𝑖,𝑡, (45) 
 
 
𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐵𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = ∆𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐵𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∆𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐵𝐿𝑖,𝑡, (46) 
 
 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑃ℎ𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐵𝐿𝑖,𝑡. (47) 
 
  In equation (47), the net worth or equity of the SME , 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑖,𝑡, is given as the value of its physical 
capital, the SME cash deposits less the value of its bank loans.   
 
4. Initial ACE Model Conditions and Simulation Results  
4.1 ACE Model Initial Conditions, Policy Rates and Risk Premia 
Section 3.1 outlined the data driven agent characteristics for the UK economy and the Appendix has 
given additional details and the data sources for this. Figure A.3 in the Appendix gives the initial 
conditions and the balance sheet data for the agents as set out in Sections 3.2-3.4.  The only remaining 
                                                             
33 In contrast to the 10% return on gross fixed capital for big firm PNFCs, see footnote 20, we are justified in halving this return for SMEs as only 
about 60% of SMEs post a profit during market downturns as in the APP period, see https://www.statista.com/statistics/291377/small-and-
medium-enterprises-sme-wholesale-retail-profitability-uk/.  
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variables that need to be discussed are the price variables.  The policy rates and lowering of bond yields 
triggered by APP are for the most part considered to exogenous to agents’ behaviour.   
Figure 5: Initial Values (Q4 2008/Q1 2009) and Average Values (In Brackets) of Interest Rates 
and Default/Credit Risk Premia (Annual) 
Rate  Col 1 : Interest rate - 
Initial Value (Average Value 2009-Q1 2015 
using )  
Col 2: Default Rates /Credit Risk 
Premia - Initial Value (Average 
Value 2009-Q1 2015 ) 
Denoted by si t: default risk cost of class i loans 
Policy rate: risk free rate (rRF)1 0.5%  N.A 
Government gilts rate (rG) 3.35%  (rG#= 2.79% ) 2 N.A 
Interest rate on mortgages (rHH)3 6.06%3 (rRF + 5.9% = 6.4%) 12.6% (5.9%)5 
Interest rate on BFs loans (rBF)4 5.3% 4 (rRF + 7.1% = 7.6%) 3.6% (7.1 %)5 
Interest rate on BFs bond debt (rS) 6% (rG#2 + 2.23%7= 5.02%) 9.89%6 (2.23%7) 
Interest rate on SMEs loans (rSME) 8.8% (rRF + 10.3%= 10.8%) 8.3% (10.3%) 
1 BoE’s policy rate. (Source: Bank of England (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk)); 2 Yield (%) on medium term 10-year gilts in 
December 2008 with average yield over the period denoted by rG#= 2.79% (Source: 
https://dmo.gov.uk/data/ExportReport?reportCode=D4H ); 3 Interest rate on mortgages: Sterling weighted average interest rate 
on loans secured on dwellings (CFMB168) in BoE interactive website, Feb 2009;  4 Interest rate on BF loans: Sterling weighted 
average interest rate on PNFC loans (CFMB162) in BoE interactive website Feb 2009.5 Data on write offs from BoE website , see 
Appendix Figure A.1. 6, 7 Speculative grade global bond default rate for 2009 : S&P Global Ratings Table 1 with the value in 
brackets being the average for the period excluding initial date34. 
The ACE model includes 6 different interest rates and 3 proxies for credit risk/default rates on the 3 
classes of bank loans (needed for the variables si,t(Li,t) , i = {BF, HH, SME}) and the default rate on 
corporate bonds. The initial values and the average values over the period from 2009 – Q1 2015 (given in 
brackets) are presented in Figure 5 above.  The average values in brackets give a better indication of how 
the impact of QE changes, in particular, the gilt yields and how the different loan categories fair in terms 
of default risk over the period.  First, the risk-free rate (rRF) and gilts rate are set to the actual levels of BoE 
policy rate (0.5%) and 10-year gilts rate (3.35%) just before the launch of APP in 2009 with the mortgage 
rates and the corporate bond rates, respectively, tracking this over time. It should be noted that while the 
policy interest rate remained at 0.5% , the 10 year gilt yields fell to under 2% in May 2012, remained 
there till May 2013 and never rising above 3% thereafter.  Likewise, despite the very high bond default 
rates in 2009, Figure 5 column (2), with the bond default rates falling over this period along with the fall 
in gilt yields bringing on average the cost of bond issuance to around 5%. The impetus for issuance of 
                                                             
34 This can be found at  
https://www.spratings.com/documents/20184/774196/2016+Annual+Global+Corporate+Default+Study+And+Rating+Transitions.pdf/2ddcf9dd
-3b82-4151-9dab-8e3fc70a7035 
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bonds follows as the interest rate of bank loans to big firms increases to over 7.6%.  With Figure 5 
showing that the initial interest rates on PNFC bank loans was lower than the cost of corporate bond 
issuance underscores the fact that in the immediate pre APP period of 2009, corporate bonds 
represented only 32.7% of nonfinancial corporations’ total debt.   
Further, premia on different types of bank loans are given to reflect the credit risk or default 
probability of the loans and the cost of capital for banks. The credit risks denoted by si,t(Li,t) , i = i = {BF, 
HH, SME} are proxied by the UK bank write off rates for each of class of loans.  As seen the Appendix 
Figure A.1, the initial values of default risk as proxied by the quarterly write off rates is 0.31% for 
mortgages (annual rate 12.6%) , 0.2.6% for SMEs (annual rate 10.3 %) and 0.18% (annual rate 3.6%) for 
BFs.  However, on average over time, SMEs have a higher write off rate and as shown in Figure 5. Hence, 
in Figure 5, loans to SMEs are given the highest initial interest rate of 8.8%, followed by 6.06% for 
mortgages and 5.3% for loans to BFs.   
 
4.2 Simulation Results 
As stated earlier, the model in this paper covers a period of 50 months from the start of APP in 2009 
and it involves the micro simulations of the interaction between different agents and the responses of 
these agents to the developments in debt markets. At any given month t, asset purchases under APP lead 
to an exogenous fall in gilts yield which is reflected in the yield of corporate bonds through the portfolio 
rebalancing effect. BFs start to change their debt financing structure when the cost of bonds becomes 
lower than bank loans cost. Meanwhile, each household receives its income, finances its consumption, 
pay its mortgage instalment, and accumulates the rest into its cash holdings.  
The first set of results that are pertinent are the monthly rates of mortgage approvals under the 3 
bank capital regime scenarios given in Figure 6.a.  These results are averaged over 50 simulations for each 
scenario and for ease of perusal the outputs of the 3 scenarios are given in one graph, Figure 6.a, with 
Figure 6.b giving the upper and lower bounds for the sample mean values at 95% confidence level. These 
are found to be statistically significant at 5%.  The charts on mortgage approvals for the 3 scenarios with 
95% confidence bands are given in Appendix Figure A.4.  These results hold the key to the systematic bias 
in bank lending in favour of mortgages in the Basel II/III risk weighted regime of Scenario 3.   
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Figure 6.a: The Proportion of Successful Mortgage Applications (Monthly) – Average of 50 
Simulations for each Scenario  
 
Notes : Scenario 1 : No Capital Requirements ; Scenario 2: Simple 8%-10% Basel I capital requirements; Scenario 3: Complex Basel 
II/III risk weighted capital requirements 
Figure 6.b Monthly mortgage approval rates (Averaged over 50 simulations for each of the Scenarios) 
 Sample Average 
Mortgage 
Approvals 
Std Deviation Lower Bound at 
95% confidence 
level 
Upper Bound at 
95% confidence 
level 
Scenario 1 0.035053* 0.045601 0.030308 0.039798 
Scenario 2 0.028589* 0.046082 0.023794 0.033384 
Scenario 3 0.037547* 0.045793 0.032782 0.042312 
  * Statistically significant P-values at 95% confidence level    
        While all 3 scenarios show a downward trend in mortgage approvals, Scenario 3 dominates in terms 
of the sample mean of 3.75% of monthly mortgage approval rates as shown in Figure 6.b.  Following the 
time series in Figure 6.a, this is the case especially after 2010. Scenario 1 comes a close second with 
approval rates at 3.5%, driven as it is by the relative credit risks given in the estimates proxied by bank 
write offs on mortgages which fall considerably by the end of 2009 while SME write offs increased (see 
Appendix Figure A.1).   Scenario 2 shows a considerable lower average in terms of monthly mortgage 
approval rates of 2.85% as it has the least scope to respond to capital adequacy constraints with no risk 
weights that favour a switch to mortgages.   
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Figure 7: Actual UK Bank Lending Aggregates  
 
Source: Bank of England’s Bankstats (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/bankstats/default.aspx) 
We will now analyse the results in terms of the aggregate lending, with the breakdown for 
mortgages, loans to BFs, and loans to SMEs for the 3 scenarios given in Figures 8, 10 and 11 respectively.  
To make them comparable to actual data given in Figure 7, the amounts of mortgages, loans to BFs, and 
loans to SMEs have been rescaled up using the proportions between the actual and the hypothetical 
numbers of the agents in the ACE model.  The main exogenous operative factor is that BFs do not change 
their debt structure during the first 20 periods till the APP impact on bond yields bite and the cost of 
security debt is still bigger than the cost of bank borrowing. The actual data in Figure 7 shows how the 
total bank loans for the classes of loans under consideration starts at about £1.6 trillion in 2009, achieves  
a relative peak in March 2010 at £1.81 trillion, which, after a severe crunch then trends downwards to 
£1.75 trillion in March 2013, marking a fall of about £60bn from the peak.  The breakdown shows that 
only mortgages grew from £0.860 Trillion in March 2010 to about £1 trillion in 2013, about a £140bn 
increase. Other loans types, respectively, fell over this period from £0.60 trillion to £0.45 trillion for BFs 
(£150bn fall) and from £0.20 trillion to £0.15 trillion for SMEs (£50bn fall). 
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Figure 8: Simulated Bank Lending Aggregates £millions (Complex Capital Requirements; Risk 
Weights) Scenario 3 (see section 3.3.3.3) 
 
The main results here is as expected, only the extant Basel II/III Scenario 3, Figure 8, corresponds 
closely with the actual data and produces the result that only the mortgage lending picks up somewhat 
while bank lending to the real economy falls.   Thus, the simulated results given in Figure 8 show a very 
close correspondence with the actual data though the 2013 March total lending is somewhat smaller at 
£1.55 trillion as opposed to about £1.72 trillion in actual data in Figure 7.  As the key assumption in our 
framework is that the impact of QE manifests first in the portfolio rebalancing behaviour by BFs in favour 
of bond issuance, the following Figure 9 summarizes this result with the follow through implications of 
the assumption that a BF one for one substitutes away from bank loans as it changes its bond to total 
debt ratio.  This then causes the rebalancing in bank portfolios in terms of mortgages and SME loans 
under the 3 scenarios.  Figure 9 shows how the ACE simulation based on the BF behavioural rule in 
Section 3.3.2 equation (15) for bond issuance results in larger absolute increases of bond issuance of 
£87.92 billion over the period from the start of APP (March 2009) to April 2013 compared to the £68.48 
billion actual increase on PNFC bonds based on data in Figure 2. However, the simulated results imply a 
less aggressive increase of 9.9% in the BF bonds to total debt ratio than the actual increase of 15.7% over 
the relevant period.  This is due to the assumption in equation (16) that simulated bank loans to BFs 
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starting at about £604 billion are reduced one-for-one with the funds generated by bond issues. 
Corresponding to the comparative static equation (41) rule of thumb of a 60% of the fall in loans to big 
firms, 𝐿𝐵𝐹,𝑡 <0, in Scenario 3, SMEs suffer a fall in loans from £0.20 trillion in 2009 to £0.147 trillion in 
2013, about £52.1billion. This is somewhat larger than the actual fall of £50 bn in SME loans in this 
period.  Finally, in the case of Scenario 3, from Figures 8 and 9 we see that simulated mortgage lending 
starts at about £0.81 trillion in 2009, shows the similar peak as with the actual data in July 2010 of about 
£1.0 trillion, falls somewhat to recover to over £1.1 trillion in May-September of 2012 and then falls to 
£0.92 trillion in March 2013.  This implies an overall cumulative increase of £110 bn of mortgage loans in 
the simulated case. As in the actual data, the increase in mortgage lending fails to overcome the fall in 
loans to big firms and to SMEs. Recall that banks loans to big firms in the ACE model falls by the same 
amount as the size of bond issuance of about £87.92 bn.  Hence, these results support our hypothesis as 
to how banks will respond to the conditions of APP when operating under Basel II/III risk weights.   
Figure 9 Summary of Key Simulated Results on Big Firm Bond Issuance, Mortgage Loans and Loans 
to SMEs Under the 3 Scenarios  (Scen 1-3) 
 BF Bond Issuance (£ 
bns) 
BF Bonds to total debt 
(bank loans + bonds) % 
Cumulative changes2 in 
mortgages (simulated) £bns 
Cumulative change in loans 
to SMEs (simulated) £bns 
 Actual1   Simulated Actual Simulated Scen1 
Initial 
£770bn 
Scen2 
Initial  
£770bn 
Scen3 
Initial  
£810bn 
Scen1 
Initial  
£150bn 
Scen2 
Initial  
£150bn 
Scen3 
Initial 
£200bn 
Start of APP 
(Mar 2009) 
£344.26 £293.47  32.7% 32.7% 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dec 2011 £388.25  £348.85  44.1% 38.9% £41.3  £23.5  £115  £0.5  £1.7  -£9.8  
June 2012 £396.57  £363.47  45.2% 40.5% £4.9  £91.5  £45.8  £3.7  £4.8  -£12.4  
Dec 2012 £406.16  £375.5 46.7% 41.8% £10.8  -£34.5  -£43.71  £4.2  £4.1  -£14.3  
End of APP 
(Apr 2013) 
£412.74  £381.39  48.4% 42.5% -£5.6  £13.7  £51.9  £5.7  £6.2  -£15.6  
Change 
(start to 
end) 
£67  £87.923  15.7% 9.9% £51.4 £94.2 £110 £14.1  
 
£16.8 
 
-£52.1 
1Actual data for Big Firm Bond Issuance is given from the same source in Figure 2 (Data code CPMB29M from the BOE 
interactive website); 2Cumulated between dates shown;3 Note given the assumptions in Section 3.3.2 equation (15), given the 
initial value of loans to big firms of about £604 bn, this category of loans fall at the same rate as bond issuance and hence in the 
given period, the ACE model will register the same £88 bn reduction in loans to big firms which corresponds to the value of bonds 
issued (simulated).     
Figure 9 shows a systematic bias against SME lending in Scenario 3, which operates in an iron clad 
way resulting in loan reductions throughout this period when compared to SME loans under the other 2 
scenarios, which continue to be positive.  It is important to note that while our result is not inconsistent 
with the studies of Thakor (1996), Hans et al. (1999), and Heid, Porath and Stolz (2004) results, in that 
banks suffering from capital inadequacy will look to improve their capital status by shifting out of high risk 
weighted loans/assets, the ACE model here builds a more detailed set conditions of APP that triggered a 
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series of events which reduced both BF loans and loans to SMEs.  SMEs suffered disproportionately only 
due to their unfavorable BaseI I/lII risk weights. As the results from the other 2 scenarios show, there was 
nothing in the economic credit risk conditions surrounding SMEs that this should have been the case. 
Figure 10: Simulated Bank Lending Aggregates (Simple Capital Requirements; No Risk Weights) 
     Scenario 2 (see section 3.3.3.2) Average of 50 simulation runs  
 
Thus, in contrast to the simulated outputs from Scenario 3, the other 2 scenarios do not show a fall in 
lending to SMEs.  In the case of Scenario 2, Figure 10, SMEs enjoy about the same level of loans around 
£0.1 Trillion and in fact this increases to about £0.12 Trillion in 2013 March.  It is expected that as Basel I 
unweighted 8% capital implies identical leverage of 12.5 for all asset classes, this could reduce total 
lending compared with Scenario 3. Hence, total lending in 2009 was £1.3 trillion below the actual data of 
£1.6 Trillion, while in March 2013, Scenario 2 shows about the same level of total lending as in the case of 
the simulated Scenario 3 at £1.5 trillion. But what is interesting in Scenario 2 is that with a lack of bias, the 
growth in mortgage lending from £0.78 trillion in March 2009 to around £0.95 trillion in March 2013, a 
cumulatively increase of £94bn (see, Figure 10), is not at the expense of loans to SMEs.  Loans to SMEs 
hold firm and also increase about £16.8 bn.  
 Finally, there is a counterintuitive result regarding Scenario 1, Figure 11, which shows the lowest 
amount of total lending at about £1.1 trillion in 2009 and £1.2 trillion in 2013 March.  The idea that the 
absence of an explicit regulatory capital rule need not lead to excessive lending runs contrary to what is 
often assumed. Indeed, as long as the banks are guided by the optimal rule based on the relative credit 
risk proxies given in Section 3.2.3.1, there is clearly no threat of excessive lending.  Also, the lack of bias 
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against SME lending means that this category of lending remains stable at about £0.15 Trillion throughout 
the conditions of APP in Scenario 1 and in fact increases by about £14 bn over this period, Figure 11.  
Mortgage loans also increase from £770bn in March 2009 to about £820bn in March 2013. 
Figure 11: Simulated Bank Lending Aggregates (No Capital Requirements) 
Scenario 1 (see section 3.3.3.1) Average of 50 simulation runs 
 
 
4.3 Model Validation 
Several validation methods have been used to validate simulated models in engineering in computer 
sciences. For instance, Sargent (2013) outlines 17 techniques that can be used to validate simulation 
models. These techniques use logical reasoning, quantitative methods, or visual representation to verify 
the soundness of simulated models. One of these techniques, historical data (or empirical) validation, is 
recommended by Windrum, Fagiolo and Moneta (2007) to assess models in the context of ACME. In their 
history-friendly approach, a good model is one that can generate several stylized facts observed in the 
actual data. To validate the model of this paper, this section examines the degree to which simulated 
lending aggregates represent actual lending aggregates. To do that, two sets of regressions are run for 
the Scenario 3 simulated results.  The R2 results, given in Figures 12 and 13 of Scenario 3, which 
corresponds with the regime in situ, clearly outperformed the regressions results of the other 2 scenarios 
(not reported). 
  In the first test set, each of the time series of simulated and actual lending aggregates is regressed 
on time (t).  This can shed light on similarities on time trends between the actual and simulated data 
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given by the slope coefficients (same signs and/or statistical significance).  The model specification for 
this test is 𝑳𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡, where L are loans to BFs, SMEs, mortgages and total lending for the simulated and 
actual time series.  
Figure 12: Summary of the Simulated (Scenario3) and Actual Bank Lending Aggregates 
Regressions on Time 
Variable Coefficient on time Standard Error p value R2 
Simulated BFs Loans 1.64 × 1010 1.51 × 109 0.00 0.7059 
Actual BFs Loans 1.80 × 1010 1.68 × 109 0.00 0.7008 
Simulated SMEs Loans 4.87 × 109 4.26 × 108 0.00 0.7269 
Actual SMEs Loans 5.18 × 109 4.71 × 108 0.00 0.7122 
Simulated Mortgages 2.93 × 1010 2.17 × 109 0.00 0.7879 
Actual Mortgages 2.91 × 1010 2.04 × 109 0.00 0.8063 
Simulated Total lending 5.06 × 1010 4.11 × 109 0.00 0.7557 
Actual Total lending 5.23 × 1010 4.17 × 109 0.00 0.7574 
 
Figure 12 shows very high similarities between simulated and actual coefficients on time for each loan 
class. The coefficients on the simulated variables are statistically significant at a high 99% confidence 
level.  
The regressions in the second group investigate the correlation between simulated and actual data by 
regressing each actual time series on the corresponding simulated one. The model specification for this 
test is 𝑳𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑳
𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 , where L are loans to BFs, SMEs, mortgages and total lending.  
Figure13: Summary of the Regression of Actual on Simulated Bank Lending Aggregates  
Variable 
Coefficient on the 
Simulated Variable 
Standard Error p value R2 
Actual BFs Loans 1.27151 0.1787335 0.00 0.5132 
Actual SMEs Loans 1.70887 0.2548637 0.00 0.4836 
Actual Mortgages 0.6392122 0.1185209 0.00 0.3773 
Actual Total lending 0.9728365 0.1510779 0.00 0.4635 
The coefficients on the simulated variables are statistically significant at a high 99% confidence level 
while R2 values in Figure 13 reveal robust correlations between the actual and simulated bank lending 
aggregates. Similarly, the comparison between the results of the regressions of each of the actual bank 
lending aggregates with the corresponding results for simulated aggregates indicate that the simulated 
data is a very good representation of the actual data.  But as discussed in the outputs from the 
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simulations, the response of agents to a regulatory system in place is far from satisfactory as it leads to a 
systematic bias against loans to SMEs. 
 
5. Conclusion 
A standard textbook model of bank lending starts with the premise that banks’ primary objective is to 
lend to non-financial firms.   We set up a data driven agent based model (ABM) of the UK bank lending 
to households for mortgages and to big firms and SMEs that reflects the reality on the ground that this is 
far from the case. In the context of QE and APP launched by UK authorities in 2009, increasing bank 
lending was one of the main goals. Yet, ONS sectoral financial accounts data shows that although bank 
lending to households for mortgages has been expanding since 2009, total bank lending witnessed a 
noticeable drop driven by a decrease in lending to businesses, especially to SMEs.  We explicitly take the 
reduced bond yields in the course of APP for triggering a portfolio rebalancing by big firms in the 
direction of bond issuance and a substitution away from bank loans as the main factor behind the 
demand side fall in bank loans from big non-financial firms.  We have shown that a data rich ACE model 
of the UK banking system, which is equipped with the Basel II/ III regulatory bank capital constraints, is 
needed to demonstrate how the slack caused in the bank loan portfolios by big firm substitution in favour 
of bonds post APP, helped expand UK loans for mortgages at the expense of loans to SMEs.  As noted by 
Goodhart and Ashworth (2012)35, this overall contraction in UK bank lending, especially to SMEs, while 
mentioned in the many papers on the impact of APP that use event studies and econometric models, they 
have failed to give a cogent explanation.  
In the spirit of Stiglitz (2011) and Jones (2010), we focus on the incentives and constraints posed 
by the Basel capital adequacy rules on the UK banking system.  The ACE model was developed to 
investigate the conditions created by APP and QE in the UK primarily on bank supply side responses for 
lending to households for mortgages and to SMEs, which unlike big firms do not have access to the bond 
market.  We have raised the important question whether regulatory capital requirements should 
penalize sectors like SMEs when clearly the credit risk conditions do not warrant this.  Indeed, the 
complex Basel II/III risk weighted framework has been implicated for causing perverse incentives and 
destabilizing capital arbitrage that exploits the risk weights both in the run up to 2007 GFC, Markose et. 
al. (2012) and in the case of the Eurozone crisis, Acharya and Steffan (2015).  
                                                             
35 Goodhart and Ashworth (2012) have used colourful language as follows: “  QE has not worked via a major expansion of bank assets/liabilities 
is simply taken as a fact of life, and a conspiracy of silence has fallen over any discussion/analysis of why this happened.  […] And why “these 
routes have failed to facilitate an expansion of bank credit expansion, notably to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)” (Ibid).  
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           Following the recent BoE agent based model of the UK mortgage market, Battista et. al.  (2017) , 
our data driven ACE model anchors the mortgage eligibility conditions for UK households in empirical 
data on their income distribution, extant home owner status and net worth after mortgage 
indebtedness.  Likewise, the relevant financial balance sheet data of other agent classes are used as 
initial conditions.  An important empirical scale factor is used to determine the proportions of the agents 
in the different classes to simulate the UK economy and to produce simulation outputs that are similar 
in value to actual macro-economic data.  As we saw this has worked.  Likewise, to focus on how the key 
bank lending decisions operate, we recommend that ACE models should embrace the embedding of an 
endogenous section within a framework of the wider economic data which is fed exogenously to the 
agents as they make their decisions at each time step within the simulator.   This is a new ingredient to 
ACE modelling that can produce quantitative outputs that are of similar magnitudes as actual variables 
and produce finely tuned institutionally rich simulations for policy analysis.  Finally, we think that there 
is some urgency to develop an extension to the extant ACE model to give more details for the behaviour 
of US and UK companies, which have been given the impetus by APP to issue bonds. These funds have 
been used to pay back bank loans and to pursue what many regard to be an excessive strategy of share 
buy backs that can contribute to stock market bubbles, corporate indebtedness and slow growth. 
 
Appendix A: Empirical Evidence on the UK Economy  
The UK economy data around the launch of APP in 2009 is used as empirical base for the ACE model. 
The Appendix includes relevant data that was used in the ACE model for the nonfinancial sectors 
(households and nonfinancial businesses) and banks in the UK that has not been discussed in Section 3. 
Figure A.1: Quarterly Loan Write-offs (%) by UK Banks by Loan Type  
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Source: Bank of England (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/iadb/newintermed.asp) 
Note: The probability of default is proxied by the ratio of loan write-offs to the total amount of loans for each loan type. The amounts of loan 
write-offs and total mortgages and business loans to BFs and SMEs are available from BoE.36  Total PNFCs (i.e. PFs + SMEs): loans (LPMB4VR), 
write offs (RPQTFHB). SMEs: loans (RPMZ8YH), write offs (RPQTFHK). 
 
Figure A.2: Top 10 UK Banks Equity to Total Assets Ratios 
Bank Date Equity to Total Assets Ratio 
HSBC 31/12/2008 2.05% 
Barclays 31/12/2008 2.12% 
Royal Bank of Scotland 31/12/2008 2.65% 
Lloyds 31/12/2008 2.22% 
Standard Chartered 31/12/2008 4.84% 
NatWest 31/12/2008 4.19% 
Santander UK 31/12/2013 4.66% 
Nationwide 31/12/2008 3.36% 
The Co-operative Bank 31/12/2008 5.27% 
Clydesdale and Yorkshire Bank 31/12/2008 4.85% 
Source: Bankscope Database available at (http://www.bvdinfo.com) 
Figure A.3: The Initial Values/Distributions of the Model’s Variables  
Variable Value/Distribution Assumptions/Empirical facts 
                                                             
36The quarterly data on the amounts outstanding of business loans and mortgages, and the amounts of loan write-
offs on the two loan types are available from BoE’s Interactive Database. For instance the  loan write off (%) for 
mortgages is given by the ratio of the variables RPQB7YW is total Sterling value of lending (secured on houses ) 
and RPQTFHD is Sterling value of write offs on mortgages to individuals. 
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Households   
Number of households 100,000 Scaled down from 21,464,730 
Number of houses per household 
Number 0 1 2 3 4 Only 64% of UK households own at least 
one property Probability 0.36 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
House price £149,400 Average house price in 2009 Q1. 
Household housing wealth Number of Houses x House price  
Household cash Uniformly distributed between £5,000 and £50,000  
Household mortgage liability Uniformly distributed between £0 and £70,965 
- 52% of the homeowners have mortgages 
- HHs average mortgage liability in 2009 Q1 
was £49,070 
Household equity 
Household housing wealth + household cash - household 
mortgage liability 
 
Household income Log-normally distributed 
The distribution is estimated using the 
monthly equivalents of IFS’s parameters of 
the weekly income distribution (in 2009 Q1) 
Household preferred bank Randomly selected  
Big Firms   
Number of big firms 24 Scaled down from 4,405 
Big firm Physical capital Uniformly distributed between £5 million and £100 billion  
Big firm cash (0.1283/0.8717) x physical capital 
cash represented 12.83% of nonfinancial 
firms’ total assets in 2009 Q1 
Big firm debt to total assets ratio 51.66% 
NFCs debt to total assets ratio in 2009 Q1 
was 51.66% 
Big firm loans 34.77% x (physical capital + cash) 
Loans represented 67.3% of NFCs total debt 
in 2009 Q1. (67.3% x 51.66% = 34.77%) 
Big firm bonds 16.89% x (physical capital + cash) 
Bonds represented 32.7% of NFCs total debt 
in 2009 Q1. (32.7% x 51.66% = 16.89%) 
Big firm equity 
Big firm physical capital + big firm cash - big firm loans - big 
firms bonds 
 
Big firm preferred bank Randomly selected  
Small and medium enterprises   
Number of SMEs 22,900 Scaled down from 4,918,915 
SME Physical capital Uniformly distributed between £50,000 and £1 million  
SME cash (0.1283/0.8717) x physical capital 
cash represented 12.83% of nonfinancial 
firms’ total assets in 2009 Q1 
SME debt to total assets ratio 40% SMEs are can only avail of bank loans  
SME loans 40% x (physical capital + cash)  
SME equity SME physical capital + SME cash - SME loans  
SME preferred bank Randomly selected  
Banks   
Number of banks 10  
Bank total mortgages Sum of mortgages of HHs that deal with the bank See above household mortgage liability 
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Bank loans to big firms Sum of loans to big firms that deal with the bank See above big firm loans 
Bank loans to SMEs Sum of loans to SMEs that deal with the bank See above SME loans 
Bank deposits 
Sum of cash of households, big firms and SMEs that deal 
with the bank 
See above for details  
Bank equity Mortgages + loans to big firms + loans to SMEs – deposits See above for details  
 
 
Figure A.4: 95 % Confidence Interval Bands for Mortgage Approval Rates given in 
Figure 6.b   
a. Scenario 1            b. Scenario 2              c. Scenario 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Shaded area represents 95% confidence interval based on 50 simulations. 
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